This paper analyses doctors' supply of after-hours care (AHC), and how it is affected by personal and family circumstances as well as the earnings structure. We use detailed survey data from a large sample of Australian General Practitioners (GPs) to estimate a structural, discrete choice model of labour supply and AHC. This allows us to jointly model GPs' decisions on the number of daytime-weekday working hours and the probability of providing AHC. We simulate GPs' labour supply responses to an increase in hourly earnings, both in a daytime-weekday setting and for AHC. GPs increase their daytimeweekday working hours if their hourly earnings in this setting increase, but only to a very small extent. GPs are somewhat more likely to provide AHC if their hourly earnings in that setting increase, but again, the effect is very small and only evident in some subgroups. Moreover, higher earnings in weekday-daytime practice reduce the probability of providing AHC, particularly for men. Increasing GPs' earnings appears to be at best relatively ineffective in encouraging increased provision of AHC and may even prove harmful if incentives are not well targeted.
INTRODUCTION
Similar to many developed countries, the Australian healthcare system is currently experiencing increased demand because of an ageing population, increases in chronic conditions that require close monitoring by General Practitioners (GPs) and higher expectations regarding service delivery. Access to high-quality health care during the night, at weekends, and outside of usual working hours is a major issue. In addition to hospital services during weekends and emergency services, primary health care can be much more cost-effective as a first point of contact for patients 'after hours'. In Australia, after-hours care (AHC) in the primary care setting consists of services provided by GPs during public holidays, weekends and weekdays outside of 08:00 to 18:00 h. These include GP visits to patients' homes, visits in GP clinics and in residential aged care facilities outside of the normal working hours. Historically, patients would expect to be seen at home by their own GP. Although this is still the case in many rural communities, changing work-life balance expectations have over time changed the provision and nature of after-hours services provided by GPs. In most developed countries, AHC is usually delivered through various organisational models that all involve GP provision. Most commonly, these include deputising services, cooperatives or roster arrangements, and practices or clinics with extended hours during evenings and weekends.
The major issues facing many countries are reductions in GP supply and changes in the way care is delivered that could reduce AHC supply, shift demand to more expensive settings and reduce quality of care. Many more women are now working as GPs and are more likely to work part time, and both men and women with family commitments have been reducing their overall hours of work in the past decade. GPs have strong preferences not to provide AHC. GPs in the UK and Australia have consistently ranked AHC and on-call as the most important job characteristic, for the avoidance of which, they would pay a large proportion of their annual income (Scott, 2001; Scott et al., 2013) . In the UK, the requirement for GPs to provide 24-hour care was removed from their contracts with the National Health Service in 2004 that led to issues in coverage and continuing policy debate about access to GPs outside of weekdays (Roland, 2004) . Between 1999 and 2009, there was a large fall in home-visiting rates by GPs in Australia, and the delivery of AHC has been shifting away from individual and group GP practices toward large-scale private deputising services or networks (Britt et al., 2014) , which has also been the trend in the UK. The number of private deputising services in Australia has increased from 16 in 2006 to 83 in 2014. Policy responses to this have been aimed at maintaining supply through changing funding and organisation models. The issue is not necessarily about increasing AHC supply above current levels but changing the way it is provided whilst ensuring 'needed' services are not reduced. Governments continue to alter financial incentives and models of AHC to encourage shifts in the type of provision. Information on whether financial incentives are likely to be effective is important in helping design policy.
The consequence of these changing models of AHC is their potential impact on healthcare access, quality of care and the overall cost of health care. As the first point of contact for patients, the provision of AHC by GPs will improve access to care outside of normal working hours, which is associated with improved patient outcomes (O'Malley, 2013) . Sufficient provision of AHC may ensure the quality of care through continuity of care if AHC is provided by the patient's regular GP. This would also avoid the need for more scripts and duplication of tests, which may arise if the patient is seen by a GP without access to their medical records or who does not know the patient. Lastly, GP AHC may reduce hospital costs by lowering Emergency Department (ED) visits or potentially preventable hospitalisations. Descriptive evidence shows patients with better access to primary care AHC had significantly reduced utilisation of more expensive ED, outpatient and inpatient care, and had significant savings of healthcare costs (Lowe et al., 2005; Huntley et al., 2014; O'Malley, 2013) . In Australia, the number of ED presentations continues to increase by an average of 3.5% per year since 2010/2011. In addition, the number of potentially preventable hospitalisations for chronic conditions was 9.7 per 1000 population in 2014/2015 and is not falling.
Facing these challenges, it is critical to understand GPs' decisions in the provision of AHC. Financial incentives that reward GPs for increased AHC are often sought as a natural policy instrument in the health sector. In the USA, it is suggested that future payment reform under patient-centred medical homes should address the issue of insufficient compensation for AHC (O'Malley, 2013) . The design of future funding schemes or payment reforms to compensate GPs for working after hours, however, requires evidence on GPs' responses to financial incentives targeted at AHC.
There has been a small literature examining the labour supply behaviour of doctors, focusing on doctors' decisions on overall working hours in response to their hourly earnings. These studies employ different types of labour supply models, ranging from reduced-form models to structural discrete choice models and dynamic panel models (Rizzo & Blumenthal, 1994; Showalter & Thurston, 1997; Thornton & Eakin, 1997; Thornton, 1998; Saether, 2005; Baltagi et al., 2005; Ikenwilo & Scott, 2007; Cheng et al., 2013; Kalb et al., 2015; Andreassen et al., 2013) . However, none of these studies has explicitly focused on doctors' labour supply behaviour outside of normal working hours.
Only a few studies have documented important factors that are associated with GPs' supply of AHC. Gravelle and Guiffrida (2001) found that GPs were more likely to provide visits themselves after an increase in fees for these visits, although they did not report the magnitude of the effect. Gravelle and Hole (2007) found that the presence of children reduces the hours of on-call of male and female GPs with the effect on female GPs being smaller, while non-UK-qualified GPs spent more hours on average being on-call than UK-qualified GPs. Crighton et al. (2005) found that Canadian GPs practising in academic and community clinics, or in after-hours clinics, and GPs offering selective medical services (emergency care, palliative care and house calls) were more likely to provide AHC. Female GPs, those practising in walk-in clinics, or GPs primarily paid by fee-forservice were less likely to do so. Pham and McRae (2015) found that Australian GPs who were employees rather than partners in a practice, female, older, worked in a group practice or lived in urban areas were less likely to provide AHC themselves.
None of these studies explicitly modelled GPs' decisions of regular working hours and after-hours labour supply simultaneously. It is important to separate these two decisions and model these choices simultaneously because GPs are likely to choose these two types of working hours on different margins, and they are likely to be jointly determined. From a policy perspective, it is essential to jointly estimate GPs' earnings elasticities in these two different settings and to allow them to vary across GPs with different circumstances.
This paper seeks to answer two questions. First, we aim to identify the important socio-economic characteristics that affect GPs' decisions in the provision of AHC. Second, we attempt to address whether financial incentives influence the provision of AHC and whether the effects of financial incentives vary by GPs' individual and family circumstances. We employ a structural discrete choice labour supply model to study GPs' choices of working hours within and outside of regular office hours and to estimate their earnings elasticities in these two settings. Our methodology provides an advantage over the often-used reduced-form model because the structural model can be used in a second step to simulate behavioural responses to changes in financial incentives incorporated in the model. In addition, unlike in the reduced-form approach, the earnings elasticity is not assumed to be constant over doctors or hours worked. We use a unique longitudinal data set from the Medicine in Australia Balancing Life and Employment (MABEL) study, which provides information on doctors' labour supply in both settings and rich information on doctors' characteristics.
The paper is structured as follows. The institutional context in Australia is briefly described in Section 2, followed by the estimation strategy in Section 3. The data are introduced in Section 4 with a discussion of the summary statistics. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
General Practitioners in Australia are paid by fee-for-service. They can charge patients what the market will bear, and patients receive a fixed subsidy from Medicare, the tax-financed national universal insurance scheme. This results in varying copayments by patients. The resulting variation in doctors' fees means that, unlike data for many other countries (e.g. see Chanel et al., 2017) , there is sufficient variation to be able to estimate earnings elasticities.
General Practitioners operate in small private practices similar to those in the UK National Health Service, although in Australia there is a longer history of corporate ownership of GP practices. Although Australian GPs do not have to provide AHC themselves, all GP practices are required to have arrangements in place for the care of their patients outside normal opening hours and to inform patients about the arrangements. These AHC arrangements have been organised in a number of ways, including provision by GPs and practices themselves, rotas across practices, cooperatives, private deputising services, national phone lines and through hospital ED. The government has provided funding for GP-provided AHC through the Medicare Benefit Schedule (MBS) items that provide subsidies for after-hours consultations by GPs in practices, patient's homes or residential aged care facilities with higher fees for 'urgent' care. These payments are two to three times higher than subsidies for daytime office visits. Between 1999 and 2013, GPs were also paid through the Practice Incentives Programme After Hours (PIPAH) incentives to provide AHC. In July 2013, the PIPAH incentive scheme was removed, and funding was transferred to Medicare Locals, Australia's regional primary care organisations, who were given responsibility to coordinate AHC in their locality. Following a review of AHC funding for primary care (Jackson, 2014) and the abolition of Medicare Locals in 2015, the PIPAH incentives were redesigned and reinstated. Per patient payments are provided which now more clearly differ depending on the nature of AHC provided, with higher payments to GPs who provide more care themselves, and lower payments if care is outsourced to a Medical Deputising Service (MDS).
In 2013, under the old PIPAH incentives, 66% of all accredited practices (about 65% of all general practices in Australia) reported arrangements for AHC provided to patients through their claims for PIPAH incentives. Of these, 23% provided at least 10 h of AHC, including through deputising services, and 17% provided 24-h care themselves. Sixty four percent of rural practices provided 24-h access compared with 18% in metropolitan areas. The number of accredited MDS's has increased from 16 in 2006 to 83 in 2014, and in 2009, around 60% of GPs subscribed to an MDS (National Association of Medical Deputising Services (NAMDS), 2014). This has fuelled an increase in claims for after-hours MBS items of 68% in the 6-year period until 2013/2014, including a 112% increase in the number of after-hours home visits, and a 201% increase in after-hours services provided in residential aged care facilities (Jackson, 2014) . MDS schemes act as a substitute for GPs who choose not to provide their own AHC, and so, their growth may reflect either unmet need for AHC or increasing numbers of GPs choosing not to provide it themselves.
ESTIMATION STRATEGY
We use a structural model of labour supply to estimate a doctor's utility function. The arguments of the doctor's utility function used in this paper include the number of working hours and their income (representing consumption of goods), which are usually included in the utility function when aiming to explain and predict labour supply decisions, and in addition, an indicator for providing AHC. Regular working hours and the provision of AHC combined determine consumption of leisure. Selected preference parameters in the utility function vary with a range of personal characteristics such as age and family structure.
We estimate labour supply as a discrete choice, similar to the method proposed by Van Soest (1995) . Each doctor i can choose between alternatives j from a set of m combinations of income and working hours in two different settings {(y ijk , h ij , a ik ); j = 1, 2, …, m, k = 0,1} where j is one of m different possible choices regarding the number of weekly working hours, and k denotes whether AHC is provided on top of regular working hours; a ik indicates whether doctor i chooses to provide AHC; h ij is the number of regular working hours doctor i chooses; y ij1 is the corresponding income if the GP provides AHC (a i1 = 1) and y ij0 is the corresponding income if the GP does not provide AHC (a i0 = 0). The term a ik allows us to capture any disutility from providing AHC -above and beyond the disutility from normal working hours -that stems from working at non-standard hours. This could be caused, for example, by a varying value of leisure depending on whether it is consumed at daytime or night-time and/or whether it is shared with others.
Ten different labour supply points j, with or without additional provision of AHC, can be chosen by the doctor.
1 The discrete labour supply points are chosen in such a way that the actual labour supply is represented as well as possible. This results in 20 different choices. Every individual is assumed to choose the alternative that leads to the highest utility. Utility is specified as a quadratic function of working hours and household income, plus a random disturbance that is assumed to follow a type-I extreme value distribution. The probability that individual i chooses alternative j and k (from the 2 m alternatives) is thus
In our specification, we allow β 0 and β 2 to depend on individual and household characteristics. Specifying ε ijk as an extreme value type I distribution leads to the computationally convenient conditional logit model.
Estimation of the probabilities in (1) requires that we determine the household net income associated with each choice j and k. Hourly earnings for regular work and average hourly earnings for the provision of AHC are derived from a wage regression. We explain weekly earnings in regular work and in AHC with a range of job characteristics and personal characteristics, as well as hours worked in both settings. Once the hourly earnings coefficients for both work settings are estimated, we calculate a weekly salary before tax for each possible combination of regular hours and AHC. Although we only model the choice to provide AHC or not, and not the hours of AHC provided, an imputed number of hours of AHC (equal to the average) is needed to compute weekly gross salary for those who choose an option including AHC. Total annual income before tax follows from multiplying weekly earnings with the number of working weeks per year and adding other household incomes such as partner income and non-labour income. We then apply relevant regulations from the tax transfer system to derive the annual household income after-tax y ijk . Further details on the estimation, such as the specific elements of the tax system that were taken into account, the exact intervals in which working hours are grouped for the estimation, and how the number of working weeks per year was derived, are provided in Broadway et al. (2016) .
The coefficients β of the model are estimated using a maximum likelihood approach based on (1). Once the utility function is estimated, we simulate an increase in hourly earnings before tax, recalculate the resulting annual household income after tax that is now associated with each choice j and k and predict the choice an individual is expected to make under the new earnings. This allows us to evaluate the potential effect of changes in earnings policies on labour supply behaviour.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We use data from the MABEL study, an annual panel survey of Australian doctors. The survey covers a broad range of topics around doctor's work arrangements, qualifications, job characteristics, attitudes and family circumstances. We use the first wave of MABEL, which was collected in 2008, and restrict our analysis to GPs. We exclude GPs who do not report whether they supply any AHC, for whom no information on working hours is available and those for whom missing information does not allow the prediction of income at different hours of work. We also exclude GPs who report zero working hours, as the data set is not suited to model labour supply decisions at the extensive margin, as well as GPs whose reported weekly workload excluding AHC exceeds 80 hours per week as these are outliers and are more likely to be measurement errors. This leads to a study sample of 724 women and 996 men. Appendix S1 reports the sample reductions due to each criterion mentioned earlier. It also compares key characteristics of GPs in the final sample and the original sample, showing that these are very similar in both samples. With regard to the key dependent variables, Table S1 .2 shows that usual working hours for men are very similar in the two samples, while for women, the final sample contains women who work slightly more hours on average. The proportion providing AHC is smaller in the final sample, particularly for female doctors. The provision of AHC is correlated with missing income information, with women being more likely to have income information missing than men. Table I shows key socio-economic characteristics that enter the preference parameters of the utility function, namely, own age, self-employment status (yes or no), own health, presence of children by age of the youngest child, and presence and employment status of a partner. Although family composition and health may be endogenous to labour supply, we have decided to follow the labour supply literature in treating family composition as exogenous as we are interested in labour supply conditional on the current circumstances. We also treat doctors' own health as exogenous because allowing for endogenous health would make the model much more complex and would detract from the focus of this paper. However, when interpreting the results, we acknowledge the potential two-way relationship between health and labour supply.
Male GPs in the sample are on average about 53 years old, 6 years older than the female GPs; this reflects the higher proportion of female GPs in younger cohorts versus older cohorts. One in three women is selfemployed, half the proportion of self-employed men. A clear majority of GPs report to be in excellent or very good health. Matching female GPs' lower age, they are more likely to live with dependent children (aged 0 to 15 years) in a household than men are, and the youngest child in the household is likely to be younger. While male and female GPs are similarly likely to have a partner, female GPs' partners are usually full-time employed, while two out of three male GPs live with a partner who works part-time or not at all. GPs' labour supply is reported in Table II , showing GPs' chosen weekly working hours and whether they supply any AHC. Women are less likely to supply AHC and more likely to work less than 35 hours per week than men are.
The first step in preparing the data for the estimation of the structural labour supply model is to predict an income for each hours-band the GPs could have chosen. The MABEL survey asks doctors for their total income General Practitioners with non-missing information in working hours, supply of after-hours care, income and relevant income determinants, and standard work hours between 1 and 80 hours per week. from clinical practice and their total household income, but it does not differentiate AHC income and income from regular working hours. Therefore, we estimate total weekly salary as a function of regular working hours per week and the number of AHC hours per week, which allows us to derive hourly earnings for both types of working hours from the model coefficients. The number of working hours in daytime-weekday practice and in AHC is interacted with a number of personal and job characteristics, allowing hourly earnings to vary across individuals. Descriptive statistics for the included job and personal characteristics are reported in Appendix S2. Table III shows the estimated earnings function. The most important determinants of regular hourly earnings are a GP's gender, qualifications, experience, self-employment status and the size of the practice he or she works in. Unpredictable work hours also play an important role, as does the complexity of patients' problems. Proportion of time spent in direct patient care, practice size and practising in rural areas are the main drivers of hourly earnings for AHC. The distribution of predicted wages corresponds closely to that of observed wages (Appendix S3), and the correlation coefficient between them is high at 0.61 for all GPs combined (and 0.58 and 0.51 for male and female GPs, respectively). This provides reassurance regarding the use of these estimates in the labour supply model.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Once we obtain an estimated net income associated with each combination of regular working hours and AHC, we estimate a conditional logit model based on Eqns (1) and (2) (see Appendix S4 for coefficients). We then estimate the marginal utility of income and marginal disutility of work using three specifications: the first specification only includes income and hours as arguments in the utility function, while the second and third allow the utility function to vary with important socio-economic characteristics. Table S4 .2 presents the marginal utility of income and working hours, and the specific variables included for each specification. For all three specifications, the model yields a utility function that fits the criteria for a 'well-behaved' utility function: doctors' utility increases in income and decreases in working hours, and the indifference curves are concave in income and leisure (this is not violated for any individual in the simplest model and for only seven individuals in the most extensive specification). All specifications perform well and reproduce closely the observed distribution of choosing a regular hour and AHC combination. Finally, we test the specifications against each other to determine whether the additional interactions significantly improve the explanatory power. Specification (3) is selected for all further analyses. A comparison of predicted probabilities based on this model with observed frequencies is shown in Appendix S5.
The impact of socio-economic characteristics on labour supply decisions
We first assess the impact of socio-economic characteristics on labour supply decisions by comparing the outcomes before and after a one-unit change of each characteristic. That is, we calculate the change in an individual's utility from a one-unit change of each characteristic. Then we calculate expected hours of work and the probability of providing AHC before and after the change, using the estimated utility function and assuming that the net salary associated with each labour supply choice remained unchanged. Averaging across all individuals yields the effect of a one-unit change in characteristics on labour supply choices. Table IV shows that the effect of age on regular working hours varies across gender. For women, we see a small, constant decrease of weekly working hours with age that amounts to roughly 0.2 weekly working hours per year; that is, ceteris paribus, we would expect a female GP in her 60s to work 6 hours less per week than a female GP in her 30s. For men, we see an inverse U-shaped age profile, with the turning point around age 40. The decreasing effect of age on labour supply is strongest for older GPs up to a decrease of 0.8 weekly working hours per year for 60 year olds. Female GPs whose youngest child is of preschool age work an average of 10 hours less than their childless counterparts do. As the child grows older, their labour supply increases again. The effects are highly significant.
2 Male GPs' labour supply, however, hardly responds to the presence of children of any age.
It appears that the main change in a female GP's life cycle affecting her labour supply is childbirth, and there are not many other relevant changes affecting her labour supply. Male GPs' labour supply on the other hand appears to respond to a range of unmeasured circumstances and preferences that change over a typical life cycle (captured by age) -such as a mortgage that is to be paid off or expected returns on investments in the form of future career prospects -but having young children hardly affects them. The results suggest that even among doctors, a relatively homogenous group of men and women who made large investments in their education, there is a traditional division of labour in the household. This is further underlined by the effect of partners' labour force status on one's own labour supply: male GPs with a partner work four to five additional hours per week compared with their single counterparts, independent of whether their partner is full-time employed or out of the labour force. However, female GPs with full-time employed partners work nearly 7 hours per week less than single female GPs and 5 hours per week more if their partners do not work. Beyond the effects of family circumstances, men and women alike have lower labour supply when they are employed rather than selfemployed À 6 hours less per week for women and 7 hours less per week for men. Being in less than very good or excellent health has a strong positive association with labour supply for men and women. This counterintuitive result may be caused by the potential endogeneity of health; that is, long working hours may lead to poor health.
When we assess the relationship between these characteristics and the probability of providing AHC, the main point to note is that the effects are very small (Table V) . Only a few of the characteristics are associated with a change in a GP's probability of supplying AHC by as much as one percentage point. Having children decreases female GPs' after-hours supply by 1.6 percentage points if the child is 0 to 4 years old and by 1.1 percentage points if the child is older than 10 years. Women with a part-time employed partner are about 1.2 percentage points less likely to supply AHC. This might reflect that women's partners, who are usually men, are more likely to work part-time only if they are relatively old or in poor health, which is usually not the case for men's partners. This would imply that women's probability of working after-hours may be reduced by care responsibilities, while men's after-hours supply usually is not. Predicted changes are based on the model estimates reported in Table S4 .1. Standard errors used to determine significance levels are bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions. The bootstrap procedure accounts for the random nature of the model estimation, but not for that of estimated wages. Also see notes Table I . *Significant at the 5%-level;
The impact of earnings on labour supply decisions
We simulate the labour supply response to a change in the before-tax salary of 1%, which affects net income at all labour supply points, but not necessarily to the same degree. We assess the impact of a change in earnings for regular working hours and AHC separately. We simulate GPs' behavioural responses for the whole sample and for subgroups of GPs of specific policy interest, that is, across different practice sizes and practice rurality. Table VI shows the change in regular-hours labour supply in response to changes in hourly earnings, including a 1% increase in regular-hours earnings only, a 1% increase in after-hours earnings only, and a 1% increase in both earnings. Female GPs' total working hours increase by 0.195% if the pre-tax earnings for regular working hours increase by 1%. 3 The effect is significant at the 5%-level. 4 No effect is found if the earnings for AHC increase by 1%. This reflects that AHC income, relative to regular-hours income, is a much smaller proportion of total earnings. Increasing both earnings simultaneously by 1% increases labour supply by 0.201%.
For women with children, the effects of increased regular-hours earnings are no longer significant. The earnings elasticity for women with young children is negative, whereas for women with school-aged children and older, the earnings elasticity cannot be estimated precisely, but might potentially be of a similar magnitude as for childless women, shown by the overlapping confidence intervals for the estimated effects. There is virtually 3 The labour supply response to an increase in regular wages is slightly different from that found in Kalb et al. (2015) , who estimate a similar model of labour supply, also using the first wave of MABEL data. They find a similarly small, but negative wage elasticity for both men and women; that is, male and female doctors very slightly reduce their working hours when their wage is increased. We attain the same result when we drop the choice of whether to provide AHC or not from the model and do not account for provision of AHC in the estimation of wages (keeping all else constant, including the doctors included in the sample). However, the main finding -that doctors' labour supply is largely unresponsive to changes in earnings -remains the same. 4 As stated before, the estimator's precision might be slightly overstated because the bootstrap procedure used to estimate standard errors cannot account for the random nature of predicted wages. If we could account for this, the earnings elasticity may no longer be found to be significant. This would reinforce the main finding that labour supply is largely unresponsive to earnings. no variation in female GPs' labour supply response to an increase in one or both components of earnings across practice size and practice rurality. Some of the patterns found for women are very similar for men. Overall male GPs increase their regular working hours by 0.194% if their pre-tax earnings for regular working hours increase by 1%, but they do not change their working hours if the earnings for AHC increase. The total earnings elasticity is 0.185 if both earnings increase simultaneously. As for female GPs, there is little variation across practice sizes and practice rurality, and male GPs without children behave very similar to the overall population of male GPs. However, a different pattern is observed for male GPs across subgroups by age of their youngest child. While we found some reduction in female GPs' responsiveness to wages if they have a very young child, this is not the case for male GPs, who seem more responsive in the presence of young children. However, overall the responsiveness to financial incentives does not vary much for men across different family circumstances or work settings, as is the case for women.
Table VII presents the change in probability of providing AHC in response to changes in hourly earnings. The middle panel of Table VII shows that an increase in AHC earnings increases the probability of providing Table S4 .1. Standard errors used to determine significance levels are bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions. The bootstrap procedure accounts for the random nature of the model estimation, but not for that of estimated earnings. Results are shown for different population groups: (i) overall population of doctors; (ii) doctors without children; (iii)-(v) doctors with children whose youngest child is 0-4 years old/5-9 years old/10-15 years old; (vi)-(vii) doctors who work in a practice with one to two doctors/three or more doctors; (viii)-(ix) doctors who work in metropolitan areas/outside of metropolitan areas. Also see notes to Table I . *Significant at the 5%-level;
AHC for both genders. However, the magnitudes are very small: increasing hourly earnings for AHC by 1% increases the probability of providing AHC by 0.100% for women and 0.144% for men. Neither men nor women appear to change their responsiveness to financial incentives much in the presence of children (and only slightly by age of the youngest child), or when they work in practices of a different size. However, for both genders, the responsiveness varies substantially by practice rurality; the strongest positive response to an increase in AHC earnings is found among rural GPs. However, even among rural GPs, the behavioural response is still small: a 1%-increase in AHC earnings leads to an increase in the probability of providing AHC by 0.522% (or 0.169 percentage points) for women and 0.436% (or 0.241 percentage points) for men. Interestingly, increasing AHC earnings has a statistically significant, small negative impact on the provision of AHC in urban areas for both genders. The left panel of Table VII demonstrates the cross-effect of an increase in regular-hours earnings on the provision of AHC. For both genders, the effect of an increase in regular-hours earnings is negative for the whole sample and for all subgroups; 5 the negative effects are statistically significant for the population of 5 The model uses average AHC hours by discrete labour supply point and gender. These average hours of AHC increase with regular labour supply (based on the observed relationship). So if an increase in regular hourly earnings increases labour supply, then the imputed hours of AHC increases as well, increasing the additional income when providing AHC, thus making the option with AHC more attractive. We cannot include the additional costs of providing more hours of AHC in the utility function, because we have no information on usual hours of AHC. If we had data that would allow us to identify the effect of AHC intensity instead of only whether any is provided, then all crosselasticities of providing AHC with respect to regular earnings would be even more negative than our estimates suggest. male GPs. That is, if GPs' ability to earn money outside of AHC increases, then they are less likely to provide AHC. Because increasing regular earnings significantly decreases GPs' probability of providing AHC, the effect of an overall earnings increase is negative to zero for most subgroups. If anything, a policy trying to use financial incentives to encourage provision of AHC needs to ensure that earnings bonuses are properly targeted.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we employ a structural discrete choice labour supply model to study GPs' choices of working hours within and outside of normal office hours. We explicitly model GPs' decisions on regular working hours and AHC simultaneously because GPs make their decisions on these separate types of working hours jointly. Using a structural model rather than a reduced-form model enables us to predict GP's behavioural responses to any hypothetical changes to earnings that may be introduced in the future. Therefore, we were able to identify the type of GPs who are providing AHC, and more importantly, to estimate the extent to which the provision of AHC is expected to increase in response to higher earnings across different types of GPs. Our study thus provides the first evidence on this important issue that has received increasing attention in the policy arena in many countries. Consistent with the literature, our results show a different life-course profile of working hours for male and female GPs, especially with regard to regular working hours. Male GPs' supply of regular working hours follows an inverted U-shaped curve, with the turning point being around age 40, whereas female GPs show gently declining labour supply with age combined with a significant decrease of regular working hours while childrearing. There is also a gender difference in working hours that depends on partner's employment status, depicting a picture where male GPs work as a breadwinner and female GPs work as a secondary earner in the household. Demographics and family circumstances play a much smaller role in the choice to provide AHC than in the choice for regular working hours. Few predictors are found for AHC À the only exception is that female GPs' probability of providing AHC is reduced by childcare responsibilities while there is no such effect on male GPs.
Our simulation results show that a 1% increase in regular hourly earnings will increase the supply of regular working hours by about 0.2% for both genders. The estimated earnings elasticities of regular working hours are well within the range of estimates found in the previous literature, with a lower bound of 0.04 for employed married physicians (Andreassen et al., 2013) and a higher bound of 0.33 for self-employed physicians (Showalter & Thurston, 1997) . They are consistent with the finding in this literature that physicians are not particularly responsive to earnings increases (Thornton, 1998; Saether, 2005; Ikenwilo & Scott, 2007; Andreassen et al., 2013) with some (Weeks et al., 2013) even finding decreases in labour supply. For female GPs, this small significant positive effect is not seen in women with young children, whereas for male GPs, this effect is fairly similar across different family circumstances.
Our results indicate that a 1% increase in hourly earnings for AHC increases the probability of providing AHC by 0.14% for male GPs; for female GPs, the magnitude is about 0.10%, and the effect is not confined to women without any children. In general, the responsiveness to AHC financial incentives is positive, but very small for both genders. A somewhat stronger response among both genders is found if GPs work in rural areas, but the response is still small. An increase in earnings for regular working hours decreases GPs' probability of providing AHC, especially for men. It is worth noting that our simulated behaviour responses on AHC are limited to the probability of providing AHC rather than the change in the number of AHC hours. This is due to data limitations: as there is no information on GPs' usual on-call and AHC hours in the data and because these are likely to vary over time, we cannot provide an estimate of the change in the number of on-call and AHC hours in response to an earnings increase.
Several important policy implications can be drawn from this study. First, while a policy that increases the hourly earnings for AHC is likely to increase participation in AHC, the effect will be relatively small. We can quantify the simulated response in the provision of AHC in the Australian context. Because there are in total about 11 000 female GPs and 15 900 male GPs in Australia, and about 32.46% of female GPs and 55.12% of male GPs in the MABEL sample currently provide some AHC, our estimated elasticity indicates that a 10% increase in AHC hourly earnings would increase the number of GPs providing AHC by 37 female GPs and 134 male GPs. The federal government spent $727m on AHC provided by GPs in 2013/2014 through the MBS and through Medicare Locals. A 10% increase in this expenditure of $72.7 would represent an additional cost of $425 000 per additional GP participating in AHC. This provides a cautionary note for any future policy reform that purely relies on higher hourly earnings for AHC as the cost of such a reform will be quite high. Second, given that an increase in earnings for regular working hours actually decreases the probability of AHC provision, if the policy goal is to improve the provision of AHC, then it is important to specifically target financial incentives to AHC services while holding the earnings from regular working hours constant. If regular hourly earnings and after-hours earnings are increased at the same time, then it is important to maintain the relativity between them to keep the current level of GP participation in AHC. Lastly, to the extent that the earnings elasticities for AHC vary across gender, family circumstances, and practice size and locations, financial incentives are unlikely to be equally effective across GPs with different family circumstances and GPs working in different locations.
In Australia, it was not possible to examine exogenous changes in the provision of funding of AHC as the policies were introduced nationally. Further research should attempt to identify and evaluate exogenous changes in earnings, or in the provision or funding of AHC, as well as exploit longitudinal data in such evaluations.
